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III. RIGHTS CLAIMED BY LITTORAL STATES IN 
ADJACENT SEAS 
1. The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), International Court 
of Justice, Judgment of 9 April 1949 
NoTE. On 22 October 1946 two British destroyers, the Saumarez andVolage, 
while navigating within Albanian territorial waters in the North Corfu Channel, 
struck mines and were seriously damaged, with heavy loss of life. On 13 No-
vember 1946 British minesweepers swept the area where the incident had oc-
curred, and recovered some mines. After having tried unsuccessfully to obtain 
an apology and compensation from Albania through diplomatic channels, the 
Government of the United Kingdom brought the dispute to the attention of the 
Security Council of the United Nations by a letter of 10 January 1947. By a 
res~lution of 9 April 1947, the Security Council recommended "that the United 
Kingdom and the Albanian Government should immediately refer the dispute to 
the lnterna tional Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute of the Court." Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, No. 
34, pp. 726-727. 
Proceedings were instituted before the Court by an application of the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom on 22 May 1947. By a letter of 2 July 1947 the 
Albanian Government stated that it accepted the recommendation of the Security 
Council and accepted "the Court's jurisdiction ·for this case." By a judgment 
of 25 March 1948, the Court rejected a preliminary objection by Albania and 
held that it had jurisdiction of the case. I. C. J. Reports 1948, p. 15. Im-
mediately after the delivery of this judgment the parties notified the Court that 
they had concluded a special agreement submitting two questions to the Court 
for decision. The Court handed down a judgment on the merits on 9 April 
1949; on the same day it issued an order setting time limits for submission of the 
parties' observations concerning the assessment of the amount of compensation 
due from Albania. I. C. J. Reports 1949, p. 171. 
(International Court of Justice Reports, 1949, pp. 4-169.) 
Present: Acting President Guerrero; President 
Basdevant; Judges Alvarez, Fabela, Hackworth, 
Winiarski, Zoricic, De Visscher, Sir Arnold MeN air, 
Klaestad, Badawi Pasha, Krylov, Read, Hsu Mo, 
Azevedo; M. Ecer, Judge ad hoc. 
In the Corfu Channel case, between the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, represented by: 
Sir Eric Beckett, K. C. M. G., K. C.; Legal 
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Adviser to the Foreign Office, as Agent and Counsel 
assisted by 
The Right Honourable Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
K. C., M.P., Attorney-General, replaced on Novem-
ber 15th, 1948, by 
Sir Frank Soskice, K. C., M.P., Solicitor-General; 
Mr. C. H. M. Waldock, Professor of international 
law in the University of Oxford, 
Mr. R. 0. Wilberforce, 
Mr. J. Mervyn Jones, and 
Mr. M. E. Reed (of the Attorney-General's 
Office), members of the English Bar, as Counsel, and 
The Government of the People's Republic of 
Albania, rep res en ted by: 
M. Kahreman Ylli, Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, as 
Agent, replaced on February 14th, 1949, by 
M. Behar Shtylla, Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, assisted 
by 
M. Pierre Cot. Professeur agrege of the Fac~lties 
of Law of France, and 
Maitre Joe Nordmann, of the Paris Bar, as Coun-
sel; and 
Maitre Marc J acquier, of the Paris Bar, and 
Maitre Paul Villard, of the Paris Bar, as 
Advocates. 
THE CouRT, composed as above, delivers the 
following judgment: 
By a Judgment delivered on March 25th, 1948 
(I. C. J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 15), in the Corfu 
Channel case, in proceedings instituted on May 
22nd, 1947, by an application of the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland against the Government of the People's 
Republic of Albania, the Court gave its decision on 
the PrE~liminary Objection filed on December 9th, 
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1947, by the latter Government. The Court rejected 
the Objection and decided that proceedings on the 
merits should continue, and fixed the time-limits for 
the filing of subsequent pleadings as follows: for the 
Counter-Memorial of Albania: June 15th, 1948; for 
the Reply of the United Kingdom: August 2nd, 
1948; for the Rejoinder of Albania: September 20th, 
1948. 
Immediately after the delivery of the judgment, 
the Court was notified by the Agents of the Parties 
of a Special Agreement, which is as follows: 
The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, repre-
sented by their Agent Mr. Kahreman Ylli, Envoy Extraordinary 
and, Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania at Paris; 
and 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, represented by their Agent, Mr. W. E. 
Beckett, C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office; 
Have accepted the present Special Agreement, which has been 
drawn up as a result of the Resolution of the Security Council of 
the 9th April, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to the Inter-
national Court of Justice for decision the following questions: 
(1) Is Albania responsible under international law for the 
explosion which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Al-
banian waters and for the damage and loss of human life 
which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay 
compensation? 
(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law 
violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic 
by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters 
on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 
1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction? 
The Parties agree that the present Special Agreement shall be 
notified to the In tern a tiona! Court of Justice immediately after 
the delivery on the 25th March of its judgment on the question 
of jurisdiction. 
The Parties request the Court, having regard to the present 
Special Agreement, to 1nake such orders with regard to pro-
cedure, in conformity with the Statute and the Rules of the 
Court, as the Court may deem fit, after having consulted the 
Agents of the Parties. 
111 
In witness whereof the above-mentioned Agents, being duly 
authorized by their Government to this effect, have signed the 
present Special Agreement. 
Done this 25th day of March, 1948, at midday, at The Hague, 
in English and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a 
single copy which shall be deposited with the International 
Court of Justice. 
On March 26th, 1948 (I. C. J. Reports 1947-1948, 
p. 53), the Court made an Order in which it placed 
on record that the Special Agreement now formed 
the basis of further proceedings before the Court, 
and stated the questions submitted to it for decision. 
The Court noted that the United Kingdom Govern-
ment, on October 1st, 1947, that is within the time-
limit fixed by the Court, had filed a Memorial with 
statements and submissions relating to the incident 
that occurred on October 22nd, 1946. It further 
noted that the Agents, having been consulted, de-
clared that they agreed in requesting that the order 
and time-limits for the filing of the subsequent 
pleadings as fixed by the Judgment of March 25th, 
1948, be maintained. The Court confirmed this 
order and these time-limits. 
The Counter-Memorial, Reply and Rejoinder were 
filed within these limits. The case was thus ready 
for hearing on September 20th, 1948, and the com-
mencement of the oral proceedings was then fixed 
for November 5th, 1948. 
As the Court did not include upon the Bench a 
judge of Albanian nationality, the Albanian Govern-
ment availed itself during the proceedings on the 
Preliminary Objection of the right provided by 
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and chose 
M. Igor Daxner, Doctor of Law, President of a 
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, 
as Judge ad hoc. On October 28th, 1948, the Reg-
istrar was informed that Judge Daxner was 
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prevented by reasons of health from sitting on the date 
fixed. The Court decided on November 2nd, 1948, 
to fix a time-limit expiring on November 7th, within 
which the Albanian Government might notify the 
name of the person whom it wished to choose as 
Judge ad hoc in place of Dr. Daxner, and to post-
pone the opening of the hearing until November 9th, 
Within the time fixed the Albanian Government 
designated M. Bohuslav Ecer, Doctor of Law and 
Professor in the Faculty of Law at Brno, and dele-
gate of the Czechoslovak Government to the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 
Public sittings were held by the Court on the 
following dates: November, 1948, 9th to 12th, 15th 
to 19th, 22nd to 26th, 28th and 29th; December, 
1948, 1st to 4th, 6th to 11th, 13th, 14th and 17th; 
January, 1949, 17th to 22nd. In the course of the 
sittings from November 9th to 19th, 1948, and from 
January 17th to 22nd, 1949, the Court heard argu-
ments by Sir Hartley Shawcross, K. C., Counsel, 
Sir Eric Beckett, K. C., Agent and Counsel, and 
Sir Frank Soskice, K. C., Counsel, on behalf of the 
United Kingdom; and by M. Kahreman Ylli, Agent, 
and MM. J. Nordmann and Pierre Cot, Counsel, 
on behalf of Albania. In the course of the sittings 
from November 22nd to December 14th, 1948, the 
Court heard the evidence of the witnesses and experts 
called by each of the Parties in reply to questions 
put to them in examination and cross-examination 
on behalf of the Parties, and by the President on 
behalf of the Court or by a Member of the Court. 
The following persons gave evidence: 
Called by the United Kingdom: 
Commander E. R. D. Sworder, O.B.E., D.S.C., 
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, as witness and 
expert; 
113 
Karel Kovacic, former Lieutenant-Comrnander in 
the Yugoslav Navy, as witness; 
Captain W. H. Selby, D.S.C., Royal Navy, as 
witness; 
Commander R. T. Paul, C.B.E., Royal Navy, as 
witness; 
Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Lankester, Royal 
Navy, as witness and expert; 
Commander R. Mestre, French Navy, as witness; 
CommanderQ. P. Whitford, O.B.E., Royal Navy, 
as witness and expert; 
Called by Albania: 
Captain Ali Shtino, Albanian Army, as witness; 
First Captain Aquile Polena, Albanian Army, as 
witness; 
Xhavit Mu\=o, former Vice-President of the Execu-
tive Committee of Saranda, as witness; 
Captain B. I. Ormanov, Bulgarian Navy, as 
expert. 
Rear-Admiral Raymond Moullec, French Navy, 
as expert. 
Documents, including maps, photographs and 
sketches, were filed by both Parties, and on one 
occasion by the Parties jointly, both as annexes to 
the pleadings, and after the close of the written 
proceedings. On one occasion during the sittings 
when a photostat of an extract from a document 
was submitted, the Court, on November 24th, 1948, 
mad-e a decision in which it reminded both Parties 
of the provisions of Article 48 and Article 43, para-
graph 1, of the Rules of Court; held that the docu-
ment in question could be received only if it were 
presented in an original and complete form; ordered 
that all documents which the Parties intended to 
use should previously be filed in the Registry; and 
reserved the right to inform the Parties later which 
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of these documents should be presented in an 
original, and which in certified true copy, form. 
Another decision as to the production of a series 
of new documents was given by the Court on Decem-
ber lOth, 1948. This decision noted that the Parties 
were agreed as to the production of certain of these 
documents and that certain others were withdrawn; 
authorized the production of certain other docu-
ments; lastly, in the case of one of these .documents, 
the examination of which had been subjected to 
certain conditions, the Court's decision placed on 
record the consent of the other Party to its produc-
tion and, in view of that consent, permitted its 
production, having regard to the special circum-
stances; but the Court expressly stated that this 
permission could not form a precedent for the future 1 • 
By an Order of December 17th, 1948, the Court, 
having regard to the fact that certain points had 
been contested between the Parties which made it 
necessary to obtain an expert opinion, defined these 
points, and entrusted the duty of giving the expert 
opinion to a Committee composed of Commodore 
J. Bull of the Royal Norwegian Navy, Commodore 
S. A. Forshell of the Royal Swedish Navy, and 
Lieutenant-CommanderS. J. W Elfferich of the Royal 
Netherlands Navy. These Experts elected Com-
modore Bull as their chairman, and filed their 
Report on January 8th, 1949, within the prescribed 
time-limit. By a decision read at a public sitting 
on January 17th, the Court requested the Experts 
to proceed to Sibenik in Yugoslavia and Saranda in 
Albania and to make on the land and in the waters 
adjacent to these places any investigations and 
experiments that they might consider useful with a 
view to verifying, completing, and, if mecessary, 
modifying the answers given in their report of 
January 8th. The Experts' second report-in which 
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Commodore Bull did not join, having been unable 
to make the journey for reasons of health-was filed 
on February 8th, 1949. On February lOth, three 
members of the Court put questions to the Experts, 
to which the Experts replied on February 12th. 
At sittings held from January 17th to 22nd, 1949, 
the representatives of the Parties had an opportunity 
of commenting orally on the Experts' report of 
January 8th. They also filed written observations2 
concerning the further statements contained in the 
Report of February 8th and the replies of February 
12th, as provided in the Court's decision of January 
17th. 
The Parties' submissions, as formulated by their 
Agents or Counsel at the end of the hearings on the 
18th, 19th, 21st and 22nd January, 1949, are as 
follows: 
Question (1) of the Special Agreement. 
On behalf of the United Kingdom: 
The Government of the United Kingdom asks the Court in 
this case to adjudge and declare as follows: 
(1) That, on October 22nd, 1946, damage was caused to His 
Majesty's ships Saun1arez and Volage, which resulted in the 
death and injuries of 44, and personal injuries to 42, British 
officers and men by a minefield of anchored automatic mines 
in the international highway of the Corfu Strait in an area 
south-west of the Bay of Saranda; 
(2) That the aforesaid minefield was laid between May 15th 
and October 22nd, 1946, by or with the connivance or knowledge 
of the Albanian Government; 
(3) That (alternatively to 2) the Albanian Government knew 
that the said minefield was lying in a part of its territorial waters; 
(4) That the Albanian Government did not notify the exist-
ence of these mines as required by the Hague Convention VIII 
1 The list of documents in support produced by the Parties and accepted by 
the Court will be found in Annex 1 to this Judgment. 
2 See Annex 2 for the Experts' Report of January 8th, the Court's decision of 
January 17th, the Experts' second Report of February 8th, the questions put by 
three members of the Court, and the Experts' replies of February 12th. 
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of 1907 in accordance with the general principle of international 
law and humanity; 
(5) That in addition, and as an aggravation of the conduct of 
Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3) and (4), the Albanian 
Government, or its agents, knowing that His Majesty's ships 
were going to make the passage through the North Corfu swept 
channel, and being in a position to observe their approach, and 
having omitted, as alleged in paragraph 4 of these conclusions 
to notify the existence of the said mines, failed to warn His 
Majesty's ships of the danger of the said mines of which the 
Albanian Government or its agents were well aware; 
(6) That in addition, and as a further aggravation of the con-
duct of Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3), (4), and (5), the 
permission of the existence without notification of the minefield 
in the North Corfu Channel, being an international highways 
was a violation of the right of innocent passage which exist, 
in favour of foreign vessels (whether warships or merchant 
ships) through such an international highway; 
(7) That the passage of His Majesty's ships through the North 
Corfu Channel on October 22nd, 1946, was an exercise of the 
right of innocent passage, according to the law and practice of 
civilized nations; 
(8) That even if, for any reason, it is held that conclusion (7) 
is not established, nevertheless, the Albanian Government is not 
thereby relieved of its international responsibility for the damage 
caused to the ships by reason of the existence of an unnotified 
minefield of which it had knowledge; 
(9) That in the circumstances set forth in the Memorial as 
summarized in the preceding paragraphs of these Conclusions, 
the Albanian Government has committed a breach of its obliga-
tions under international law, and is internationally responsible 
to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the 
deaths, injuries and damage caused to His Majesty's ships and 
personnel, as set out more particularly in paragraph 18 of the 
Memorial and the Annexes thereto; 
(10) That the Albanian Government is under an obligation to 
the Government of the United Kingdom to make reparation in 
respect of the breach of its international obligations as aforesaid; 
(11) That His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
.has, as a result of the breach by the Albanian Government of its 
obligations under international law, sustained the following 
damage: 
Damage to H .M .S. Saumarez .... ............................ . 
Damage to H.M.S. Volage .. ................................. . 
Compensation for the pensions and other expenses incurred by the 
Government of the United Kingdom in respect of the deaths and 
injuries of naval personnel ............. . .. . ......... . ....... . 







(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement of March 25th, 
1948, the following question has been submitted to the Inter-
national Court of Justice: 
c Is Albania responsible under international law for the ex-
plosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in 
Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life 
which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay 
compensation?' 
The Court would not have jurisdiction, in virtue of this 
Special Agreement, to decide, if the case arose, on the claim 
for the assessment of the compensation set out in the sub-
missions of the United Kingdom Government. 
(2) It has not been proved that the mines which caused the 
accidents of October 22nd, 1946, were laid by Albania. 
(3) It has not been prov:~d that these mines vvere laid by a 
third Power on behalf of Albania. 
(4) It has not been proved that these mines were laid with the 
help or acquiescence of Albania. 
(5) It has not been proved that Albania knew, before the 
incidents of October 22nd, 1946, that these mines were in her 
terri to rial waters. 
(6) Consequently, Albania cannot be declared responsible, 
under international law, for the explosions which occurred on 
October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian W"aters, and for the damage 
and loss of human life which resulted from them. Albania 
owes no compensation to the United Kingdom Government. 
Question (2) of the Special Agreement. 
On behalf of the Albanian Government: 
[Translation.] 
(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement concluded on 
March 25th, 1948, the International Court of Justice has before 
it the following question: 
Has the United Kingdom under international law vio-
lated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by 
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reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on 
the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946, 
and is there any duty to give satisfaction? 
(2) The coastal State is entitled, in exceptional circumstances, 
to regulate the passage of foreign warships through its territorial 
waters. 
(3) This rule is applicable to the North Carfu Channel. 
(4) In October and November, 1946, there existed, in this 
area, exceptional circumstances which gave the Albanian 
Government the right to require that foreign warships should 
obtain previous authorization before passing through its terri-
torial waters. 
(5) The passage of several British warships through Albanian 
territorial waters on October 22nd, 1946, ·without previous 
authorization, constituted a breach of international law. 
(6) In any case that passage was not of an innocent character. 
(7) The British naval authorities were not entitled to proceed 
on November 12th and 13th, 1946, to sweep mines in Albanian 
territorial waters without the previous consent of the Albanian 
authorities. 
(8) The Court should find that, on both these occasions, the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland committed a breach of the rules of inter-
national law and that the Albanian Government has a right to 
demand that it should give satisfaction therefor." 
On behalf of the United Kingdom Government: 
I ask the Court to decide that on neither head of the counter-
claim has Albania made out her case, and that there is no ground 
for the Court to award nominal damages of one farthing or one 
franc. 
* * * * * 
By the first part of the Special Agreement, the 
following question is submitted to the Court: 
(1) Is Albania responsible under international law for the 
explosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian 
waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted 
from them and is there any duty to pay con1pensation? 
On October 22nd, 1946, a squadron of British 
warships, the cruisers Mauritius and Leander and 
the destroyers Saumarez and Volage, left the port of 
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Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel 
previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait. 
The cruiser Mauritius was leading, followed by the 
destroyer Saumarez; at a certain distance thereafter 
came the cruiser Leander followed by the destroyer 
Volage. Outside the Bay of Saranda, Saumarez 
struck a mine and was heavily damaged. Volage 
was ordered to give her assistance and to take her 
in tow. Whilst towing the damaged ship, Volage 
struck a mine and was much damaged. Neverthe-
less, she succeeded in towing the other ship back 
to Corfu. 
Three weeks later, on November 13th, the North 
Corfu Channel was swept by British minesweepers 
and twenty-two moored mines were cut. Two 
mines were taken· to Malta for expert examination. 
During the minesweeping operations it was thought 
that the mines were of the German GR type, but 
it was subsequently established that they were of 
the German GY type. 
The Court will consider first whether the two 
explosions that occurred on October 22nd, 1946, 
were caused by mines belonging to the minefield 
discovered on November 13th. 
It was pointed out on behalf of the United King-
dom Government that this minefield had been 
recently laid. This was disputed in the Albanian 
pleadings but was no longer disputed during the 
hearing. One of the Albanian Counsel expressly 
recognized that the minefield had been recently laid, 
and the other Counsel subsequently made a similar 
declaration. It was further asserted on behalf of 
the Albanian Government that the minefield must 
have been laid after October 22nd; this would make 
it impossible at the same time to maintain that the 
minefield was old. The documents produced by the 
United Kingdom Government and the statements 
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made by the Court's Experts and based on these 
documents show that the minefield had been recently 
laid. This is now established. 
The United Kingdom Government contended that 
the mines which struck the two ships on October 
22nd were part of this minefield. 
This was contested by the Albanian Government, 
which argued that these mines may have been floating 
mines, coming from old minefields in the vicinity, 
or magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, 
or German GR mines. It was also contested by 
them that the explosions occurred in the previously 
swept channel at the place where the minefield was 
discovered. The Albanian Government also con-
tended that the minefield was laid after October 
22nd, between that date and the minesweeping 
operation on 12-13th November. 
On the evidence produced, the Court finds that 
the following facts are established: 
In October, 1944, the North Corfu Ch·annel was 
swept by the British Navy and no mines were found 
in the channel thus swept, whereupon the existence 
of a safe route through the Channel was announced 
in November 1944. In January and February, 1945, 
the Channel was check-swept by the British Navy 
with negative results. That the British Admiralty 
must have considered the Channel to be a safe route 
for navigation is shown by the fact that on May 15th, 
1946, it sent two British cruisers and on October 
22nd a squadron through the Channel without any 
special measures of precaution against danger from 
moored mines. It was in this swept channel that 
the minefield was discovered on November 13th, 
1946. 
It is further proved by evidence produced by the 
United Kingdom Government that the mining of 
Saumarez and Volage occurred in Albanian territorial 
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waters, just at the place in the swept channel where 
the minefield was found, as indica ted on the chart 
forming Annex 9 to the United Kingdom Memorial. 
This is confirmed by the Court's Experts, who con-
sider it to be free from any doubt that the two ships 
were mined in approximately the position indicated 
on this chart. 
It is established by the evidence of witnesses that 
the minefield consisted of moored con tact mines of 
the German GY type. It is further shown by the 
nature of the damage sustained by the two ships, 
and confirmed by witnesses and experts, that it 
could not have been caused by floating mines, mag-
netic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or 
German GR mines. The experts of the Court have 
stated that the nature of the damage excludes the 
faintest possibility of its cause being a floating mine; 
nor could it have been caused by a ground mine. 
They also expressed the view that the damage must 
have been caused by the explosion of moored contact 
mines, each having a charge of approximately 600 lbs. 
of explosives, and that the two ships struck mines 
of the same type as those which were swept on 
November 13th, 1946. 
The Albanian Government put forward a sug-
gestion that the minefield discovered on November 
13th may have been laid after October 22nd, so 
that the explosions that occurred on this latter date 
would not have been caused by mines from the field 
in question. But it brought no evidence in support 
of this supposition. As it has been established that 
the explosions could only have been due to moored 
mines having an explosive charge similar to that 
contained in GY mines, there would, if the Albanian 
contention were true, have been at least two mines 
of this nature in the channel outside the Bay of 
Saranda, in spite of the sweep in October 1944 and 
855422-50-9 
122 
the check-sweeps in January and February 1945; 
and these mines would have been struck by the two 
vessels at points fairly close to one another on 
October 22nd, 1946. Such a supposition is too im-
probable to be accepted. 
The Court consequently finds that the following 
facts are established. The two ships were mined 
in Albanian territorial waters in a previously swept 
and check-swept channel just at the place where a 
newly laid minefield consisting of moored contact 
German GY mines was discovered three weeks later. 
The damage sustained by the ships was inconsistent 
with damage which could have been caused by 
floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic 
moored mines, or German GR mines, but its nature 
and extent were such as would be caused by mines 
of the type found in the minefield. In such circum-
stances the Court arrives at the conclusion that the 
explosions were due to mines belonging to that 
minefield. 
* * * * * 
Such are the facts upon which the Court must, in 
order to reply to the first question of the Special 
Agreement, give judgment as to Albania's respon-
sibility for the explosions on October 22nd, 1946, 
and for the damage and loss of human life which 
resulted, and for the compensation, if any, due in 
respect of such damage and loss. 
To begin with, the foundation for Albania's re-
sponsibility, as alleged by the United Kingdom, must 
be considered. On this subject, the main position 
of the United Kingdom is to be found in its submis-
sion No. 2: that the minefield which caused the ex-
plosions was laid between May 15th, 1946, and 
October 22nd, 1946, by or with the connivance or 
knowledge of the Albanian Government. 
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The Court considered first the various grounds 
for responsibility alleged in this submission. 
In fact, although the United Kingdom Govern-
ment never abandoned its contention that Albania 
herself laid the mines, very little attempt was made 
by the Government to demonstrate this point. In 
the written Reply, the United Kingdom Government 
takes note of the Albanian Government's formal 
statement that it did not lay the mines, and was not in 
a position to do so, as Albania possessed no navy; 
and that, on the whole Albanian littoral, the Albanian 
authorities only had a few launches and motor boats. 
In the light of these statements, the Albanian Gov-
ernment was called upon, in the Reply, to disclose 
the circumstances in which two Yugoslav war 
vessels, the Mljet and the M eljine, carrying contact 
mines of the GY type, sailed southward from the 
port of Sibenik on or about October 18th, and pro-
ceeded to the Corfu Channel. The United Kingdom 
Government, having thus indicated the argument 
upon which it was thenceforth to concentrate, stated 
that it proposed to show that the said warships, with 
the knowledge and connivance of the Albanian Gov-
ernment, laid mines in the Corfu Channel just before 
October 22nd, 1946. The facts were presented in 
the same light and in the same language in the oral 
reply by Counsel for the United Kingdom Govern-
ment at the sittings on January 17th and 18th, 1949. 
Although the suggestion that the minefield was 
laid"by Albania was repeated in the United Kingdom 
statement in Court on January 18th, 1949, and in 
the final submissions read in Court on the same day, 
this suggestion was in fact hardly put forward at 
that time except pro memoria, and no evidence in 
support was furnished. 
In these circumstances, the Court need pay no 
further attention to this rna tter. 
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The Court now comes to the second alternative 
argument of the United Kingdom Government, 
namely, that the minefield was laid with the con-
nivance of the Alba.nian Government. According 
to this argument, the minelaying operation was 
carried out by two Yugoslav warships at a date prior 
to October 22nd, but very near that date. This 
would imply collusion between the Albanian and 
the Yugoslav Governments, consisting either of a 
request by the Albanian Government to the Yugoslav 
Government for assistance, or of acquiescence by the 
Albanian authorities in the laying of the mines. 
In proof of this collusion, the United Kingdom 
Government relied on the evidence of Lieutenant-
Commander Kovacic, as shown in his affidavit of 
October 4th, 1948, and in his statements in Court 
at the public sittings on November 24th, 25th, 26th 
and 27th, 1948. The Court gave much attention to 
this evidence and to the documentary information 
supplied by the Parties. It supplemented and 
checked all this information by sending two experts 
appointed by it to Sibenik: CommodoreS. A. Forshell 
and Lieutenant-CommanderS.]. W. Elfferich. 
Without deciding as to the personal sincerity of 
the witness Kovacic, or the truth of what he said, 
the Court finds that the facts stated by the witness 
from his personal knowledge are not sufficient .to 
prove what the United Kingdom Government con-
sidered them to prove. His allegations that he saw 
mines being loaded upon two Yugoslav minesweepers 
at Sibenik and that these two vessels departed from 
Sibenik about October 18th and returned a few days 
after the occurrence of the explosions do not suffice 
to constitute decisive legal proof that the mines were 
laid by these two vessels in Albanian waters off 
Saranda. The statements attributed by the witness 
Kovacic to third parties, of which the Court has 
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received no personal and direct confirmation, can 
be regarded only as allegations falling short of con-
clusive evidence. A charge of such exceptional 
gravity against a State would require a degree of 
certainty that has not been reached here. 
Apart from Kovacic's evidence, the United King-
dom Government endeavoured to prove collusion 
between Albania and Yugoslavia by certain pre-
sumptions of fact, or circumstantial evidence, such 
as the possession, at that time, by Yugoslavia, and 
by no other neighbouring State, of GY mines, and 
by the bond of close political and military alliance 
between Albania and Yugoslavia, resulting from the 
Treaty of friendship and mutual assistance signed 
by those two States on July 9th, 1946. 
The Court considers that, even in so far as these 
facts are established, they lead to no firm conclusion. 
It has not been legally established that Yugoslavia 
possessed any GY mines, and the origin of the mines 
laid in Albanian territorial waters remains a matter 
for conjecture. It is clear that the existence of a 
treaty, such as that of July 9th, 1946, however close 
may be the bonds uniting its signatories, in no way 
leads to the conclusion that they participated in a 
criminal act. 
On its side, the Yugoslav Government, although 
not a party to the proceedings, authorized the 
Albanian Government to produce certain Yugoslav 
documents, for the purpose of refuting the United 
Kingdom contention that the mines had been laid 
by two ships of the Yugoslav Navy. As the Court 
was anxious for full light to be thrown on the facts 
alleged, it did not refuse to receive these doc;uments. 
But Yugoslavia's absence from the proceedings 
meant that these documents could only be admitted 
as evidence subject to reserves, and the Court· finds 
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it unnecessary to express an op1n1on upon their 
probative value. 
The Court need not dwell on the assertion of one 
of the Counsel for the Albanian Government that 
the minefield might have been laid by the Greek 
Government. It is enough to say that this was a 
mere conjecture which, as Counsel himself admitted, 
was based on no proof. 
In the light of the information now a vail able to 
the Court, the authors of the minelaying remain 
unknown. In any case, the task of the Court, as 
defined by the Special Agreement, is to decide 
whether Albania is responsible, under international 
law, for the explosions which occurred on October 
22nd, 1946, and to give judgment as to the compen-
sation, if any. 
Finally, the United Kingdom Government put 
forward the argument that, whoever the authors of 
the minelaying were, it could not have been done 
without the Albanian Government's knowledge. 
It is clear that knowledge of the minela ying cannot 
be imputed to the Albanian Government by reason 
merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in 
Albanian territorial waters caused the explosions of 
which the British warships were the victims. It is 
true, as international practice shows, that a State on 
whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary 
to international law has occurred, may be called 
upon to give an explanation. It is also true that 
that State cannot evade such a request by limiting 
itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circum-
stances of the act and of its authors. The State 
may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply 
particulars of the use made by it of the means of 
information and inquiry at its disposal. But it can-
not be concluded from the mere fact of the control 
exercised by a State over its territory and waters 
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that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have 
known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein , nor 
yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, 
the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from 
other circumstances, neither involves prima facie re-
sponsibility nor shifts the burden of proof. 
On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive terri-
torial control exercised by a State within its frontiers 
has a bearing upon the methods of proof available 
to establish the knowledge of that State as to such 
events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other 
State, the victim of a breach of international law, is 
often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving 
rise to responsibility. Such a State should be al-
lowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact 
and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence 
is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recog-
nized by international decisions. It must be re-
garded as of special weight when it is based on a 
series of facts linked together and leading logically 
to a single conclusion. 
The Court must examine therefore whether it has 
been established by means of indirect evidence that 
Albania has knowledge of minelaying in her terri-
torial waters independently of any connivance on her 
part in this operation. The proof may be drawn 
from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no 
room for reasonable doubt. The elements of fact on 
which these inferences can be based may differ from 
those which are relevant to _ the question of con-
nivance. 
In the present case, two series of facts, which 
corroborate · one another, have to be considered: the 
first relates to Albania's attitude before and after 
the disaster of October 22nd, 1946; the other concerns 
the feasibility of observing minelaying from the 
Albanian coast. 
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1. It is clearly established that the Albanian 
Government constantly kept a close watch over the 
waters of the North Corfu Channel, at any rate after 
May 1946. This vigilance is proved by the declara-
tion of the Albanian Delegate in the Security Council 
on February 19th, 1947 (Official Records of the Se-
curity Council, Second Year, No. 16, p. 328), and 
especially by the diplomatic notes of the Albanian 
Government concerning the passage of foreign ships 
through its territorial waters. This vigilance some-
times went so far as to involve the use of force: for 
example the gunfire in the direction of the British 
cruisers Orion and Superb on May 15th, 1946, and 
the shots fired at the U.N.R.R.A. tug and barges on 
October 29th, 1946, as established by the affidavit 
Enrico Bargellini, which was not seriously contested. 
The Albanian Government's notes are all evidence 
of its intention to keep a jealous watch on its terri-
torial waters. The note verb ale addressed to the 
United Kingdom on May 21st, 1946, reveals the 
existence of a "General Order", in execution of which 
the Coastal Commander gave the order to fire in 
the direction of the British cruisers. This same 
note formulates a demand that "permission" shall 
be given, by the Albanian authorities, for passage 
through terri to rial waters. The insistence on "for-
malities" and "permission" by Albania is repeated 
in the Albanian note of June 19th. 
As the Parties agree that the minefield had been 
recently laid, it must be concluded that the operation 
was carried out during the period of close watch by 
the Albanian authorities in this sector. This con-
clusion renders the Albanian Government's assertion 
of ignorance a priori somewhat improbable. 
The Court also noted the reply of Captain Ali 
Shtino to a question put by it; this reply shows that 
the witness, who had been called on to replace the 
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Coastal Defence Commander for a period of thirteen 
to fifteen days, immediately before the events of 
October 22nd, had received the following order: 
"That the look-out posts must inform me of every 
movement [in the Corfu Channel], and that no action 
would be taken on our part." 
The telegrams sent by the Albanian Government 
on November 13th and November 27th, 1946, to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at a 
time when that Government was fully aware of the 
discovery of the minefield in Albanian territorial 
waters, are especially significant of the measures 
taken by the Albanian Government. In the first 
telegram, that Government raised the strongest pro-
test against the movements and actibity of British 
naval units in its territorial waters on November 12th 
and 13th, 1946, without even mentioning the exist-
ence of a minefield in these waters. In the second, 
it repeats its accusations against the United King-
dom, without in any way protesting against the lay-
ing of this minefield which, if effected without 
Albania's consent, constituted a very serious violation 
of her sovereignty. 
Another indication of the Albanian Government's 
knowledge consists in the fact that that Government 
did not notify the presence of mines in its waters, at 
the moment when it must have known this, at the 
latest after the sweep on November 13th, and further, 
wh~reas the Greek Government immediately ap-
pointed a Commission to inquire into the events of 
October 22nd, the Albanian Government took no 
decision of such a nature, nor did it proceed to the 
judicial investigation incumbent, in such a case, on 
the territorial sovereign. 
This attitude does not seem reconcilable with the 
alleged ignorance of the Albanian authorities that 
the minefield had been laid in Albanian territorial 
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waters. It could be explained if the Albanian Gov-
ernment, while knowing of the minelaying, desired 
the circumstances of the operation to remain secret. 
2. As regards the possibility of observing mine-
laying from the Albanian coast, the Court regards 
the following facts, relating to the technical condi-
tions of a secret minela ying and to the Albanian 
surveillance, as particularly important. 
The Bay of Saranda and the channel used by ship-
ping through the Strait are, from their geographical 
configuration, easily watched; the entrance of the 
bay is dominated by heights offering excellent ob-
servation points, both over the bay and over the 
Strait; whilst the channel throughout is close to the 
Albanian coast. The laying of a minefield in these 
waters could hardly fail to have been observed by 
the Albanian coastal defences. 
On this subject, it must first be said that the 
minelaying operation itself must have required a 
certain time. The method adopted required, accord-
ing to the Experts of the Court, the methodical and 
well thought-out laying of two rows of mines that 
had clearly a combined offensive and defensive pur-
pose: offensive, to prevent the passage, through the 
Channel, of vessels drawing ten feet of water or 
more; defensive, to prevent vessels of the same 
draught from entering the Bay of Saranda. The 
report of the Experts reckons the time that the mine-
layers would have been in the waters, between Cape 
Kiephali and St. George's Monastery, at between 
two and two and a half hours. This is sufficient 
time to attract the attention of the observation posts, 
placed, as the Albanian Government stated, at Cape 
Kiephali and St. George's Monastery. 
The facilities for . observation from the coast are 
confirmed by the two following circumstances: the 
distance of the nearest mine from the coast was only 
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500 metres; the minelayers must have passed at not 
more than about 500 metres from the coast between 
Denta Point and St. George's Monastery. 
Being anxious to obtain any technical information 
that might guide it in its search for the truth, the 
Court submitted the following question to the Ex-
perts appointed by it: 
On the assumption that the mines discovered on November 
13th, 1946, were laid at some date within the few preceding 
months, whoever may have laid them, you are requested to ex-
amine the information available regarding (a) the number and 
the nature of the mines, (b) the means for laying them, and (c) 
the time required to do so, having regard to the different states 
of the sea, the conditions of the locality, and the different 
weather conditions, and to ascertain whether it is possible in 
that way to draw any conclusions, and, if so, what conclusions, 
in regard to: 
(1) the means employed for laying the minefield dis-
covered on November 13th, 1946, and 
(2) the possibility of mooring those mines with those 
means without the Albanian authorities being aware of it, 
having regard to the extent of the 1neasures of vigilance 
existing in the Saranda region. 
As the first Report submitted by the Experts did 
not seem entirely conclusive, the Court, by a decision 
of January 17th, 1949, asked the Experts to go to 
Saranda and to verify, complete and, if necessary, 
modify their answers. In this way, observations 
were made and various experiments carried out on 
the spot, in the presence of the experts of the Parties 
and" of Albanian officials, with a view to estimating 
the possibility of the minelaying having been ob-
served by the Albanian look-out posts. On this 
subject reference must be made to a test of visibility 
by night, carried out on the evening of January 28th, 
1949, at St. George's Monastery. A motor ship, 27 
metres long, and with no bridge, wheel-house, or 
funnel, and very low on the water, was used. The 
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ship was completely blacked out, and on a moonless 
night, i.e., under the most favourable conditions for 
a voiding discovery, it was clearly seen and heard 
from St. George's Monastery. The noise of the 
motor was heard at a distance of 1,800 metres, and 
the ship itself was sigh ted at 670 metres and remained 
visible up to about 1,900 metres. 
The Experts Report on this visit stated that: 
The Experts consider it to be indisputable that if a normal 
look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and St. 
George's Monastery, and if the look-outs were equipped with 
binoculars as has been stated, under normal weather conditions 
for this area, the minelaying operations shown in Annex 9 to the 
United Kingdom Memorial must have been noticed by these 
coastguards. 
The Court cannot fail to give great weight to the 
opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in 
a manner giving every guarantee of correct and im-
partial information. Apart from the existence of a 
look-out post at Cape Denta, which has not been 
proved, the Court, basing itself on the declarations 
of the Albanian Government that look-out posts were 
stationed at Cape Kiephali and St. George's Mon-
astery, refers to the following conclusions in the 
Experts' Report: (1) that in the case of minelaying 
from the North towards the South, the minelayers 
would have been seen from Cape Kiephali; (2) in the 
case of minelaying from the South, the minelayers 
would have been seen from Cape Kiephali and St. 
George's Monastery. 
From all the facts and observations mentioned 
above, the Court draws the conclusion that ·the laying 
of the minefield which caused the explosions on Octo-
ber 22nd, 1946, could not have been accomplished 
without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. 
The obligations resulting for Albania from this 
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knowledge are not disputed between the Parties. 
Counsel for the Albanian Government expressly 
recognized that [translation] "if Albania had been in-
formed of the operation before the incidents of 
October 22nd, and in time to warn the British vessels 
and shipping in general of the existence of mines in 
the Corfu Channel, her responsibility would be in-
volved .... ". 
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian 
authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of 
shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in 
Albanian territorial waters and in warning the ap-
proaching British warships of the imminent danger 
to which the minefield exposed them. Such obliga-
tions are based not on ·the Hague Convention of 
1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time of war, 
but on certain general and well-recognized principles, 
namely: elementa:t;y considerations of humanity, even 
more exacting in peace than in war; the· principle of 
the freedom of maritime communication; and every 
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory 
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
States. 
Irt fact, Albania neither notified the existence of 
the minefield, nor warned the British .warships of the 
danger they were approaching. 
But Albania's obligation to notify shipping of the 
existence of mines in her waters depends on her hav-
ing ~obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient time 
before October 22nd; and the duty of the Albanian 
coastal authorities to warn the British ships depends 
on the time that elapsed between the moment that 
these ships were reported and the moment of the first 
explosion. 
On this subject, the Court makes the following 
observations. As has already been stated, the Par-
ties agree that the mines were recently laid. It must 
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be concluded that the minelaying, whatever may 
have been its exact date, was done at a time when 
there was a close Albanian surveillance over the 
Strait. If it be supposed that it took place at the 
last possible moment, i.e., in the night of October 
21st-22nd, the only conclusion to be drawn would 
be that a general notification to the shipping of all 
States before the time of the explosions would have 
been difficult, perhaps even impossible. But this 
would certainly not have prevented the Albanian 
authorities from taking, as they should have done, 
all necessary steps immediately to warn ships near 
the danger zone, more especially those that were 
approaching that zone. When on October 22nd 
about 13.00 hours the British warships were reported 
by the look-out post at St. George's Monastery to 
the Commander of the Coastal Defences as approach-
ing Cape Long, it was perfectly possible for the Al-
banian authorities to use the interval of almost two 
hours that elapsed before the explosion affecting 
Saumarez (14.53 hours or 14.55 hours) to warn the 
vessels of the danger in to which they were running. 
In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian 
authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave 
omissions involve the international responsibility of 
Albania. 
The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that 
Albania is responsible under international law for the 
explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in 
Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of 
human life which resulted from them, and that there 
is a duty upon Albania to pay compensation to the 
United Kingdom. 
* * * * * 
In the final submissions contained in its oral reply, 
the United Kingdom Government asked the Court 
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to give judgment that, as a result of the breach by 
the Albanian Government of its obligations under 
international law, it had sustained damages amount-
ing to £875,000. 
In the last oral statement submitted in its name, 
the Albanian Government, for the first time, asserted 
that the Court would not have jurisdiction, in virtue 
of the Special Agreement to assess the amount of 
compensation. No reason was given in support of 
this new assertion, and the United Kingdom Agent 
did not ask leave to reply. The question of the 
Court's jurisdiction was not argued between the 
Parties. 
In the first question of the Special Agreement the 
Court is asked: 
(i) Is Albania under international law responsible 
for the explosions and for the damage and loss of 
human life which resulted from them, and 
(ii) is there any duty to pay compensation? 
This text gives rise to certain doubts. If point (i) 
is answered in the affirmative, it follows from the 
establishment of responsibility that compensation is 
due, and it would be superfluous to add point (ii) 
unless the Parties had something else in mind than a 
mere declaration by the Court that compensation is 
due. It would indeed be incompatible with the 
generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit 
that a provision of this sort occurring in a special 
agreement should be devoid of purport or effect. In 
this connexion, the Court refers to the views ex-
pressed by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice with regard to similar questions of interpre-
tation. In Advisory Opinion No. 13 of July 23rd 
1926, that Court said (Series B., No. 13, p. 19): 
"But, so far as concerns the specific question of com-
petence now pending, it may suffice to observe that 
the Court, in determining the nature and scope of a 
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measure, must look to its practical effect rather than 
to the predominant motive that may be conjectured 
to have inspired it." In its Order of August 19th, 
1929, in the Free Zones case, the Court said (Series 
A., No. 22, p. 13): "in case of doubt, the clauses of 
a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to 
the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence 
to their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the 
clauses themselves to have appropriate effects". 
The Court thinks it necessary to refer to the dif-
ferent stages of the procedure. In its Resolution of 
April 9th, 1947, the Security Council recommended 
-that the two Governments should immediately refer 
"the dispute" to the Court. This Resolution had 
without doubt for its aim the final adjustment of 
the whole dispute. In pursuance of the Resolution, 
the Government of the · United Kingdom filed an 
Application in which the Court was asked, inter 
alia, to "determine the reparation or compensation", 
and in its Memorial that Government stated the 
various sums claimed. The Albanian Government 
thereupon submitted a Preliminary Objection, which 
was rejected by the Court by its Judgment of March 
25th, 1948. Immediately after this judgment was 
delivered, the Agents of the Parties notified the Court 
of the conclusion of a Special Agreement. Com-
menting upon this step taken by the Parties, the 
Agent of the Albanian Government said that in the 
circumstances of the present case a special agreement 
on which "the whole procedure" should be based was 
essential. He further said [translation]: "As I have 
stated on several occasions, it has always been the 
intention of the Albanian Government to respect the 
decision taken by the Security Council on April 9th, 
1947, in virtue of which the present Special Agree-
ment is submitted to the International Court of 
Justice." 
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Neither the Albanian nor the United Kingdom 
Agent suggested in any way that the Special Agree-
ment had limited the competence of the Court in 
this matter to a decision merely upon the principle 
of compensation or that the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment had abandoned an important part of its 
original claim. The main object both Parties had in 
mind when they concluded the Special Agreement was 
to establish a complete equality between them by 
replacing the original procedure based on a unilateral 
Application by a procedure based on a Special Agree-
ment. There is no suggestion that this .change as 
to procedure was intended to involve any change 
with regard to the merits of the British claim as 
originally presented in the Application and Me-
morial. Accordingly, the Court, after consulting 
the Parties, in its Order of March 26th, 1948, main-
tained the United Kingdom's Memorial, filed pre-
viously, "with statements and submissions". These 
submissions included the claim for a fixed sum of 
compensation. 
The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows that 
it was not their intention, by entering into the Special 
Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the 
amount of the compensation. In its Reply (para-
graph 71) the United Kingdom Government main-
tained the submissions contained in paragraph 96 
of its Memorial, including the claim for a fixed 
amount of reparation. This claim was expressly 
repeated in the final United Kingdom submissions. 
In paragraph 52 of its Counter-Memorial, the Al-
banian Government stated that it had no knowledge 
of the loss of human life and damage to ships, but 
it did not contest the Court's competence to decide 
this question. In the Rejoinder, paragraph 96, that 
Government declared that, owing to its claim for 
the dismissal of the case, it was unnecessary for it to 
855422-50-10 
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examine the United Kingdom's claim for reparation . 
[Translation.] "It reserves the right if need be, to 
discuss this point which should obviously form the 
subject of an expert opinion." Having regard to 
what is said above as to the previous attitude of that 
Government, this statement must be considered as 
an implied acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to 
decide this question. 
It may be asked why the Parties, when drafting 
the Special Agreement, did not expressly ask the 
Court to assess the amount of the damage, but used 
the words: "and is there any duty to pay compensa-
tion?" It seems probable that the explanation is to 
be found in the similarity between this clause and 
the corresponding clause in the second part of the 
Special Agreement: "and is there any duty to give 
satisfaction?" 
The Albanian Government has not disputed the 
competence of the Court to decide what kind of 
satisfaction is due under this part of the Agreement. 
The case was argued on behalf of both Parties on 
the basis that this question should be decided by the 
Court. In the written pleadings, the Albanian Gov-
ernment contended that it was entitled to apologies. 
During the oral proceedings, Counsel for Albania 
discussed the question whether a pecuniary sa tisfac-
tion was due. As no damage was caused, he did 
not claim any sum of money. He concluded trans-
lation]: "What we desire is the declaration of the 
Court from a legal point of view." 
If, however, the Court is competent to decide 
what kind of satisfaction is due to Albania under the 
second part of the Special Agreement, it is difficult 
to see why it should lack competence to decide the 
amount of compensation which is due to the United 
Kingdom under the first part. The clauses used in 
the Special Agreement are parallel. It cannot be 
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supposed that the Parties, while drafting these 
clauses in the same form, intended to give them 
opposite meanings-the one as giving the Court 
jurisdiction, the other as denying such jurisdiction. 
As has been said above, the Security Council, in 
its Resolution of April 9th, 1947, undoubtedly in-
tended that the whole dispute should be decided by 
the Court. If, however, the Court should limit 
itself to saying that there is a duty to pay compensa-
tion without deciding what amount of compensation 
is due, the dispute would not be finally decided. An 
important part of it would remain unsettled. As 
both Parties have repeatedly declared that they 
accept the Resolution of the Security Council, such a 
result would not conform with their declarations. 
It would not give full effect to the Resolution, but 
would leave open the possibility of a further dispute. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court has arrived 
at. the conclusion that it has jurisdiction to assess the 
amount of the compensation. This cannot, how-
ever, be done in the present Judgment. The Al-
banian Government has not yet stated which items, 
if any, of the various sums claimed it contests, and 
the United Kingdom Government has not submitted 
its evidence with regard to them. 
The Court therefore considers that further pro-
ceedings on this subject are necessary; the order and 
time-limits of these proceedings will be fixed by the 
Order of this date. 
* * * * * 
In the second part of the Special Agreement, the 
following question is submitted to the Court: 
(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated 
the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by reason of 
the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the 22nd 
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October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there 
any duty to give satisfaction? 
The Court will first consider whether the sov-
ereignty of Albania was violated by reason of the 
acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on 
October 22nd, 1946. 
On May 15th, 1946, the British cruisers Orion and 
Superb, while passing southward through the North 
Corfu Channel, were fired at by an Albanian battery 
in the vicinity of Saranda. It appears from the re-
port of the commanding naval officer dated May 
29th, 1946, that the firing started when the ships had 
already passed the battery, and were moving away 
from it; that from 12 to 20 rounds were fired; that 
the firing lasted 12 minutes and ceased only when the 
ships 'vere out of range; but that the ships were not 
hit although there were a number of "shorts" and of 
"overs". An Albanian note of May 21st states that 
' the Coastal Commander ordered a few shots to be 
fired in the direction of the ships "in accordance with 
a General Order founded on international law". 
The United Kingdom Government at once pro-
tested to the Albanian Government, stating that in-
nocent passage through straits is a right recognized 
by international law. There ensued a diplomatic 
correspondence in which the Albanian Government 
asserted that foreign warships and merchant vessels 
had no right to pass through Albanian territorial 
waters without prior notification to, and the permis-
sion of, the Albanian authorities. This view was 
put into effect by a communication of the Albanian 
Chief of Staff, dated May 17th, 1946, which pur-
ported to subject the passage of foreign warships and 
merchant vessels in Albanian territorial waters to 
previous notification to and authorization by the 
Albanian Government. The diplomatic correspond-
ence continued, and culminated in a United Kingdom 
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note of August 2nd, 1946, in which the United King-
dom Government maintained its view with regard to 
the right of innocent passage through straits forming 
routes for international maritime traffic between two 
parts of the high seas. The note ended with the 
warning that if Albanian coastal batteries in the 
future opened fire on any British warship passing 
through the Corfu Channel, the fire would be 
returned. 
The contents of this note were, on August 1st, 
communicated by the British Admiralty to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, with the in-
struction that he should refrain from using the 
Channel until the note had been presented to the 
Albanian Government. On August lOth, he re-
ceived from the Admiralty the following telegram: 
"The Albanian·s have now received the note. North 
Corfu Strait may now be used by ships of your fleet, 
but only when essential and with armament in fore 
and aft position. If coastal guns fire at ships passing 
through the Strait, ships should fire back." On 
September 21st, the following telegram was sent by 
the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-
ranean: "Establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Albania is again under consideration by His Majesty's 
Government who wish to know whether the Albanian 
Government have learnt to behave themselves. In-
formation is requested whether any ships under your 
command have passed through the North Corfu 
Strait since August and, if not, whether you intend 
them to do so shortly." The Commander-in-Chief 
answered the next day that his ships had not done 
so yet, but that it was his intention that Mauritius 
and Leander and two destroyers should do so when 
they departed from Corfu on October 22nd. 
It was in such circumstances that these two 
cruisers together with the destroyers Saumarez and 
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Volage were sent through the North Corfu Strait on 
that date. 
The Court will now consider the Albanian con-
tention that the United Kingdom Government vio-
lated Albanian sovereignty by sending the warships 
through this Strait without the previous authoriza-
tion of the Albanian Government. 
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recog-
nized and in accordance with international custom 
that States in time of peace have a right to send their 
warships through straits used for international navi-
gation between two parts of the high seas without 
the previous authorization of a coastal State, pro-
vided that the passage is innocent. Unless other-
"'ise prescribed in an international convention, there 
is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage 
through straits in time of peace. 
The Albanian Government does not dispute that 
the North Corfu Channel is a strait in the geographi-
cal sense; but it denies that this Channel belongs to 
the class of international highways through which 
a right of passage exists, on the grounds that it is 
only of secondary importance and not even a neces-
sary route between two parts of the high seas, and 
that it is used almost exclusively for local traffic to 
and from the ports of Corfu and Saranda. 
It may be asked whether the test is to be found in 
the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in 
its greater or lesser importance for international 
navigation. But in the opinion of the Court the 
decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation 
as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact 
of its being used for in tern a tional navigation. Nor 
can it be decisive that this Strait is not a necessary 
route between two parts of the high seas, but only 
an alternative ·passage between the lEgean and the 
Adriatic Seas. It has nevertheless been a useful 
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route for international mar1t1me traffic. In this 
respect, the Agent of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment gave the Court the following information relat-
ing to the period from April 1st, 1936, to December 
31st, 1937: "The following is the total number of 
ships putting in at the Port of Corfu ·after passing 
through or just before passing through the Channel. 
During the period of one year nine months, the total 
number of ships was 2,884. The flags of the ships 
are Greek, Italian, Roumanian, Yugoslav, French, 
Albanian and British. Clearly, very small vessels 
are included, as the entries for Albanian vessels are 
high, and of course one vessel may make several 
journeys, but 2,884 ships for a reriod of one year nine 
months is quite a large figure. These figures relate 
to vessels visited by the Customs at Corfu and so do 
not include the large number of vessels which went 
through the Strait without calling at Corfu at all." 
There were also regular sailings through the Strait 
by Greek vessels three times weekly, by a British 
ship fortnightly, and by two Yugoslav vessels weekly 
and by two others fortnightly. The Court is further 
informed that the British Navy has regularly used 
this Channel for eighty years or more, and that it has 
also been used by the navies of other States. 
One fact of particular importance is that the North 
Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier between Albania 
and Greece, that a part of it is wholly within the 
terri to rial waters of these States, and that the Strait 
is of special importance to Greece by reason of the 
traffic to and from the port of Corfu. 
Having regard to these various considerations, the 
Court has arrived at the conclusion that the North 
Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging to 
the class of international highways through which 
passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in 
time of peace. 
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On the other hand, it is a fact that the two coastal 
States did not maintain normal relations, that 
Greece had made territorial claims precisely with 
regard to a part of Albanian territory bordering on 
the Channel,. that Greece had declared that she con-
sidered herself technically in a state of war with 
Albania, and that Albania, invoking the danger of 
Greek incursions, had considered it necessary to take 
certain measures of vigilance in this region. The 
Court is of opinion that Albania, in view of these 
exceptional circumstances, would have been justified 
in issuing regulations in respect of the passage of 
\varships through the Strait, but not in prohibiting 
such passage or in subjecting it to the requirement, 
of special authorization. 
For these reasons the Court is unable to accept the 
Albanian contention that the Government of the 
United Kingdom has violated Albanian sovereignty 
by sending the warships through the Strait without 
having obtained the previous authorization of the 
Albanian Government. 
In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to con-
sider the more general question, much debated by 
the Parties, whether States under international law 
has a right to send warships in time of peace through 
territorial waters not included in a strait. 
The Albanian Government has further contended 
that the sovereignty of Albania was violated because 
the passage of the British warships on October 22nd, 
1946, was not an innocent passage. The reasons 
advanced in support of this contention may be 
summed up as follows: The passage was not an 
ordinary passage, but a political mission; the ships 
were manoeuvring and sailing in diamond combat 
formation with soldiers on board; the position of 
the guns was not consistent with innocent passage; 
the vessels passed with crews at action stations; the 
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number of the ships and their armament surpassed 
what was necessary in order to attain their object 
and showed an intention to intimidate and not merely 
to pass; the ships had received orders to observe and 
report upon the coastal defences and this order was 
carried out. 
It is shown by the Admiralty telegram of Septem-
ber 21st, cited above, and admitted by the United 
Kingdom Agent, that the object of sending the war-
ships through the Strait was not only to carry out a 
passage for purposes of navigation, but also to test 
Albania's attitude. As mentioned above, the Al-
banian Government, on May 15th, 1946, tried to 
impose by means of gunfire its view with · regard to 
the passage. As the exchange of diplomatic notes 
did not lead to any clarification, the Government of 
the United Kingdom wanted to ascertain by other 
means whether the Albanian Government would 
maintain its illegal attitude and again impose its 
view by firing at passing ships. The legality of this 
measure taken by the Government of the United 
~ingdom cannot be disputed, provided that it was 
carried out in a manner consistent with the require-
ments of international law. The "mission" was 
designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly 
denied. The Government of the United Kingdom 
was not bound to abstain from exercising its right 
of passage, which the Albanian Government had 
illegally denied. 
If remains, therefore, to consider whether the 
manner in which the passage was carried out was con-
sistent with the principle of innocent passage and to 
examine the various contentions of the Albanian 
Government in so far as they appear to be relevant. 
When the Albanian coastguards at St. George's 
Monastery reported that the British warships were 
sailing in combat formation and were manoeuvring, 
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they must have been under a misapprehension . It 
is shown by the evidence that the ships were not 
proceeding in combat formation, but in line, one after 
the other, and that they were not manoeuvring until 
after the first explosion. Their movements thereafter 
were due to the explosions and were made necessary 
in order to save human life and the mined ships. It 
is shown by the evidence of witnesses that the con-
tention that soldiers were on board must be due to a 
misunderstanding probably arising from the fact that 
the two cruisers carried their usual detachment of 
marines. 
It is known from the above-mentioned order issued 
by the British Admiralty on August lOth, 1946, that 
ships, when using the North Corfu Strait, must pass 
with arman1ent in fore and aft position. That this 
order was carried out during the passage on Octo-
ber 22nd is stated by the Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean, in a telegram of October 26th to the 
Admiralty. The guns were, he reported, "trained 
fore and aft, which is their normal position at sea in 
peace time, and were not loaded". It is confirmed. 
by the commanders of Saumarez and Volage that the 
guns were in this position before the explosions. The 
navigating officer on board Mauritius explained that 
all guns on that cruiser were in their normal stowage 
position. The main guns were in the line of the ship, 
and the anti-aircraft guns were pointing outwards 
and up into the air, which is the normal position of 
these guns on a cruiser both in harbour and at sea. 
In the light of this evidence, the Court cannot accept 
the Albanian contention that the position of the guns 
was inconsistent with the rules of innocent passage. 
In the above-mentioned telegram of October 26th, 
the Commander-in-Chief reported that the passage 
"was made with ships at action stations in order that 
they might be able to retaliate quickly if fired upon 
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again" . In view of the firing from the Albanian 
battery on May 15th, this measure of precaution 
cannot, in itself, be regarded as unreasonable. But 
four warships-two cruisers and two destroyers-
passed in this manner, with crews at action stations, 
ready to retaliate quickly if fired upon. They passed 
one after another through this narrow channel, close 
to the Albanian coast, at a time of political tension in 
this region. The intention must have been, not only 
to test Albania's attitude, but at the same time to 
demonstrate such force that she would abstain from 
firing again on passing ships. Having regard, how-
ever, to all the circumstances of the case, as de-
scribed above, the Court is unable to character-
ize these measures taken by the United Kingdom 
authorities as a violation of Albania's sovereignty. 
The Admiralty Chart, Annex 21 to the Memorial, 
shows that coastal defences in the Saranda region had 
been observed and reported. In a report of the com-
mander of Volage, dated October 23rd, 1946-a re-
port relating to the passage on the 22nd-i t is stated: 
"The most was made of the opportunities to study 
Albanian defences at close range. These included, 
with reference to XCU .... "-and he then gives a 
description of some coastal defences. 
In accordance with Article 49 of the Statute of the 
Court and Article 54 of its Rules, the Court requested 
the United Kingdom Agent to produce the docu-
ments referred to as XCU for the use of the Court. 
Those documents were not produced, the Agent 
pleading naval secrecy; and the United Kingdom 
witnesses declined to answer questions relating to 
them. It is not therefore possible to know the real 
content of these naval orders. The Court cannot, 
however, draw from this refusal to produce the orders 
any conclusions differing from those to which the 
actual events gave rise. The United Kingdom Agent 
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stated that the instructions in these orders related 
solely to the contingency of shots being fired from the 
coast-which did not happen. If it is true, as the 
commander of Voltage said in evidence, that the 
orders contained information concerning certain posi-
tions from which the British warships might have 
been fired at, it cannot be deduced therefrom that 
the vessels had received orders to reconnoitre Al-
banian coastal defences. Lastly, as the Court has 
to judge of the innocent nature of the passage, it 
cannot remain indifferent to the fact that, though 
two warships struck mines, there was no reaction, 
either on their part or on that of the cruisers that 
accompanied them. 
With regard to the observations of coastal defences 
made after the explosions, these were justified by the 
fact that two ships had just been blown up and that, 
in this critical situation, their commanders might fear 
that they would be fired on from the coast, as on 
May 15th. 
Having thus examined the various contentions of 
the Albanian Government in so far as they appear 
to be relevant, the Court has arrived at the conclusion 
that the United Kingdom did not violate the sover-
eignty of Albania by reason of the acts of the British 
Navy in Albanian waters on October 22nd, 1946. 
* * * * * 
In addition to the passage of the United Kingdom 
warships on October 22nd, 1946, the second question 
in the Special Agreement relates to the acts of the 
Royal Navy in Albanian waters on November 12th 
and 13th, 1946. This is the minesweeping operation 
called "Operation Retail" by the Parties during the 
proceedings. This name will be used in the present 
Judgment. 
After the explosions of October 22nd, the United 
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Kingdom Government sent a note to the Albanian 
Government, in which it announced its intention to 
sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The Albanian 
reply, which was received in London on October 31st, 
stated that the Albanian Government would not give 
its consent to this unless the operation in question 
took place outside Albanian territorial waters. Mean-
while, at the United Kingdom Governments request, 
the International Centre Mine Clearance Board de-
cided, in a resolution of November 1st, 1946, that 
there should be a further sweep of the Channel, sub-
ject to Albania'$ consent. The United Kingdom 
Government having informed the Albanian Govern-
ment, in a communication of November lOth, that 
the proposed sweep would take place on November 
12th, the Albanian Government replied on the 11th, 
protesting against this "unilateral decision of His 
Majesty's Government". It said it did not consider 
it inconvenient that the British fleet should undertake 
the sweeping of the channel of navigation, but added 
that, before sweeping was carried out, it considered 
it indispensable to decide what area of the sea should 
be deemed to constitute this channel, and proposed 
the establishment of a Mixed Commission for the 
purpose. It ended by saying that any sweeping 
undertaken without the consent of the Albanian 
Government outside the channel thus constituted, 
i.e., inside Albanian terri to rial waters where foreign 
warships have no reason to sail, could only be con-
sidered as a aeliberate violation of Albanian territory 
and sovereignty. 
After this exchange of notes, "Operation Retail" 
took place on November 12th and 13th. Commander 
Mestre, of the French Navy, was asked to attend as 
observer, and was present at the sweep on November 
13th. The operation was carried out under the pro-
tection of an important covering force composed of 
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an aircraft carrier, cruisers and other war vessels . 
This covering force remained throughout the opera-
tion at a certain distance to the west of the Channel, 
except for the frigate St. Bride's Bay, which was 
stationed in the Channel south-east of Cape Kiephali. 
The sweep began in the morning of November 13th, 
at about 9 o'clock, and ended in the afternoon near 
nightfall. The area swept was Albanian territorial 
waters, and within the limits of the channel previous-
ly swept. 
The United Kingdom Government does not dis-
pute that "Operation Retail" was carried out against 
the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Govern-
ment. It recognizes that the operation had not 
the consent of the international mine clearance 
organizations, that it could not be justified as the 
exercise of a right of innocent passage, and lastly 
that, in principle, international law does not allow 
a State to assemble a large number of warships in 
the territorial waters of another State and to carry 
out minesweeping in those waters. The United 
Kingdom Government states that the operation was 
one of extreme urgency, and that it ~onsidered itself 
entitled to carry it out without anybody's consent. 
The United Kingdom Government put forward 
two reasons in justification. First, the Agreement 
of November 22nd, 1945, signed by the Govern-
ments of the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet 
Union and the United States of America, author-
izing regional mine clearance organizations, such as 
the Mediterranean Zone Board, to divide the sectors 
in their respective zones amongst the States con-
cerned "for sweeping. Relying on the circumstance 
that the Corfu Channel was in the sector allotted to 
Greece by the Mediterranean Zone Board on Novem-
ber 5th, i.e., before the signing of the above-men-
tioned Agreement, the United Kingdom Government 
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put forward a permission given by the Hellenic Gov-
ernment to resweep the navigable channel. 
1,he Court does not consider this argument . . 
COnVInCing. 
It must be noted that, as the United Kingdom 
Government admits, the need for resweeping the 
Channel was not under consideration in November 
1945; for previous sweeps in 1944 and 1945 were 
considered as having effected complete safety. As a 
consequence, the allocation of the sector in question 
to Greece, and, therefore, the permission of the 
Hellenic Government which is relied on, were both 
of them merely nominal. It is also to be remarked 
that Alb~nia was not consulted regarding the alloca-
tion to Greece of the sector in question, despite the 
fact that the Channel passed through Albanian 
terri to rial waters. 
But, in fact, the explosions of October 22nd, 1946, 
in a channel declared safe for navigation, and one 
which the United Kingdom Government, more than 
any other government, had reason to consider safe, 
raised quite a different problem from that of a routine 
sweep carried out under the orders of the mineclear-
ance organizations. These explosions were sus-
picious; they raised a question of responsibility. 
Accordingly, this was the ground on which the 
United Kingdom Government chose to establish its 
main line of defence. According to that Govern-
ment, the corpora delicti must be secured as quickly 
as possible, for fear they should be taken away, 
without leaving traces, by the authors of the mine-
laying or by the Albanian authorities. This justi-
fication took two distinct forms in the United King-
dom Government's arguments. It was presented 
first as a new and special application of the theory of 
intervention, by means of which the State interven-
ing would secure possession of evidence in the 
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territory of another State, in order to submit it to 
an international tribunal and thus facilitate its task. 
The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. 
The Court can only regard the alleged right of inter-
vention as the manifestation of a policy of force, 
such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious 
abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present 
defects in in tern a tional organization, find a place in 
international law. Intervention is perhaps still less 
admissible in the particular form it would take here; 
for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved 
for the most powerful States, and might easily lead 
to perverting the adminstra tion of in tern a tional 
justice itself. 
The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, 
has further classified "Operation Retail" among 
methods of self-protection or self-help. The Court 
cannot accept this defence either. Between inde-
pendent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is 
an essential foundation of in tern a tional relations. 
The Court recognizes that the Albanian Govern-
ment's complete failure to carry out its duties after 
the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplo-
matic notes, are extenuating circumstances for the 
action of the United Kingdom Government. But 
to ensure respect for international law, of which it 
is the organ, the Court must declare that the action 
of the British Navy constituted a violation of 
Albanian sovereignty. 
This declaration is in accordance with the request 
made by Albania through her Counsel, and is in 
itself appropriate satisfaction. 
The method of carrying out "Operation Retail" 
has also been criticized by the Albanian Government, 
the main ground of complaint bei'ng that the United 
Kingdom, on that occasion, made use of an unnec-
essarily large display of force, out of proportion to 
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the requirements of the sweep . The Court thinks 
that this criticism is not justified . It does not con-
sider that the action of the British Navy was a 
demonstration of force for the purpose of exercising 
political pressure on Albania. The responsible naval 
commander, who kept his ships at a distance from 
the coast, cannot be reproached for having employed 
an important covering force in a region where twice 
within a few months his ships had been the object 
of serious outrages. 
For these reasons, the Court, on the first question 
put by the Special Agreement of March 25th, 1948, 
by eleven votes to five, 
Gives judgment that the People's Republic of 
Albania is responsible under international law for the 
explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in 
Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of 
human life that resulted therefrom; and by ten votes 
to six, 
Reserves for further consideration the assessment 
of the amount of compensation and regulates the 
procedure on this subject by an Order dated this day; 
On the second question put by the Special Agree-
ment of March 25th, 1948, by fourteen vo~es to two, 
Gives judgment that the United Kingdom did not 
violate the sovereignty of the People's Republic of 
Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in 
Albanian waters on October 22nd, 1946; and unani-
mously · 
Gives judgment that by reason of the acts of the 
British Navy in Albanian waters in the course of the 
Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the 
United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the 
People's Republic of Albania, and that this declara-
tion by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate 
satisfaction. 
Done in French and English, the French text being 
855422-50-11 
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authorative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this 
ninth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and 
forty-nine, in three copies, one of which will be 
placed in the archives of the Court and the others 
transmitted to the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of 
the People's Republic of Albania respectively. 
(Signed) J. G. GuERRERO, 
Acting President. 
(Signed) E. HAMBRO, 
Registrar. 
Judge Basdevant, President of the Court, whilst 
accepting the whole of the operative part of the 
Judgment, feels bound to state that he cannot accept 
the reasons given by the Court in support of its juris-
diction to assess the amount of compensation, other 
reasons being in his opinion more decisive. 
Judge Zoricic declares that he is unable to~ agree 
either with the operative clause or with the reasons 
for the Judgment in the part relating to Albania's 
responsibility; the arguments submitted, and the 
facts established are not such as to convince him that 
the Albanian Government was, or ought to have 
been, aware, before November 13th, 1946, of the 
existence of the minefield discovered on that date. 
On the one hand, the attitude adopted by a govern-
ment when confronted by certain facts varies accord-
ing to the circumstances, to its mentality, to the 
means at its disposal and to its experience in the 
conduct of public affairs. But it has not been con-
tested that, in 1946, Albania had a new Government 
possessing no experience in international practice. 
It is therefore difficult to draw any inferences what-
ever from its attitude. Again, the conclusion of the 
Experts that the operation of laying the mines must 
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have been seen is subject to an express reservation: 
it Tvvould be necessary to assume the realization of 
several conditions, in particular the maintenance of 
normal look-out posts at .Cape Kiephali, Denta Point 
and San Giorgio Monastery, and the existence of 
normal weather conditions at the date. But the 
Court knows neither the date on which the mines 
were laid nor the weather conditions prevailing on 
that date. Furthermore, no proof has been furnished 
of the presence of a look-out post on Denta Point, 
though that, according to the Experts, would have 
been the only post which would necessarily have 
observed the minelaying. On the other hand, the 
remaining posts would merely have been able to ob-
serve the passage of the ships, and there is no evi-
dence to show that they ought to have concluded 
that the ships were going to lay mines. According 
to the Experts, these posts could neither have seen 
nor heard the minelaying, because the San Giorgio 
Monastery was 2,000 m. from the nearest mine and 
Cape Kiephali was several kilometres away from it. 
As a result, the Court is confronted with suspicions, 
conjectures and presumptions, the foundations for 
which, in Judge Zoricic' s view, are too uncertain to 
justify him in imputing to a State the responsibility 
for a grave delinquency in international law. 
Judge Alvarez, whilst concurring in the Judgment 
of the Court, has availed himself of the right con-
ferred on him by Article 57 of the Statute and ap-
pended to the Judgment a statement of his individual 
op1n1on. 
Judges Winiarski, Badawi Pasha, Krylov and 
Azevedo, and Judge ad hoc Ecer, declaring that they 
are unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court, 
have availed themselves of the right conferred on 
them by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to 
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the Judgment statements of their dissenting opinions. 
[Initialed] J. G. G. 
[Initialed] E. H. 
[Individual and dissentirlg opinions omitted.] 
2. United States Laws and Regulations 
A. HARBORS CLoSED To FoREIGN VEsSELS 
NoTE. By an Act of 15 May 1820 (3 Stat. 597) it was made unlawful for a 
period of two years "for any foreign armed vessels to enter any harbour be-
longing to the United States, excepting only those of Portland, Boston, New 
London, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Smithville, in North Carolina, 
Charleston, and Mobile; unless when such vessels shall be forced in by distress, 
by the dangers of the sea, or by being pursued by an enemy, and be unable to 
make any of the ports above mentioned." The President was given authority 
to employ such part of the land and naval forces of the United States or the 
militia thereof as he might deem necessary to enforce these provisions. 
A report of 20 February 1904 by the General Board of the Navy, approved 
by the Secretary of the Navy, stated, 
"The General Board is of the opinion that with the exception of the below-
named ports, no restrictions should be placed on the visits of foreign men-of-war 
or other public vessels, either as to number or period of stay, in ports within the 
United States or under their control; neither should it be required that previous 
permission must be obtained. 
"The General Board is further of the opinion that before visiting any of tlte 
following-named ports all foreign men-of-war or public vessels should be re-
quired to ask permission from the Secretary of theN avy, through their respective 
Ministers, and the State Department: 
"Tortugas, Florida. 
"Great Harbor, Culebra. 
"Guantanamo, Cuba. 
"Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 
"Guam. 
"Subig Bay, Philippine Islands. 
"It is, of course, understood that any -foreign vessel, before entering the 
actual limits of a navy-yard in any port of the United States, would first apply 
for permission" [3 Laws Relating to the Navy (1945), p. 1865]. 
This report was transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary 
of State, who by a circular of 2 March 1904 instructed the diplomatic officers 
of the United States to communicate the report to the governments to which 
they were accredited, "with a view to indicate the present policy of this Govern-
ment regarding the visits of foreign men-of-war to the ports of the United States 
or those under the control of this Government." In a supplemental report of 
28 April 1904, also approved by the Secretary of the Navy, the General Board 
recommended that the ports and anchorages of the Kiska Islands be added to the 
list. This report was likewise transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy to the 
Secretary of State, who by a circular of 30 April 1904 instructed the diplomatic 
officers of the United States to inform the governments to which they were 
